Tag Archives: criminal law

The Role of Intermediaries in Enhancing Access to Justice in ADR

Posted on by
Reply

Dr Oz Susler & Dr John Taggart

Introduction

Over the past thirty years, there has been a ‘sea change’ in the treatment of vulnerable court and tribunal users in the United Kingdom. As noted by Lady Justice Hallett in the case of R v Lubemba: ‘Advocates must adapt to the witness, not the other way round.’ Formal rules now place a duty on judges in both civil and criminal cases to ensure that ‘every reasonable step’ is taken to facilitate the participation of witnesses in proceedings.

Emblematic of this culture shift has been the introduction of a new role known as the ‘intermediary’. The intermediary, a communication specialist, is one of a range of ‘special measures’ which were introduced in 1999 through the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJCEA) to improve the quality of evidence available to a court and reduce the stress associated with the justice process. The function of the intermediary is to communicate ‘questions put to the witness ’and ‘to any person asking such questions, the answers given by the witness in reply to them’. As well as assisting witnesses to give evidence in court, intermediaries also advise lawyers and judges on how best to communicate with the witness more broadly.

Background

In England and Wales, the first cohort of intermediaries was introduced in 2004 through what has become known as the ‘Witness Intermediary Scheme’ (WIS) which is run by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The WIS matches the vulnerable witness with an intermediary based on their communication needs. The majority of intermediaries operating in England and Wales are speech and language therapists; however, there has been an increase in numbers from other backgrounds, such as teaching, nursing, social work, psychology, and occupational therapy.

In Northern Ireland, a slightly different intermediary scheme operates compared to England and Wales. In 2013, the Department of Justice of Northern Ireland (DOJ) developed a model for the provision of intermediaries in the criminal justice system. This was based on the provisions of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1999, which effectively mirror the provisions of the YJCEA. In Northern Ireland, intermediaries are all trained, registered, and regulated by the DOJ. As in England and Wales, the vast majority of those on the Registered Intermediary Scheme (RIS) register are speech and language therapists, with a number coming from a social work background. A crucial distinction between the intermediary schemes in England, Wales and Northern Ireland is that in the latter, both witnesses and defendants can access the services of registered intermediaries. The DOJ concluded that respect for the principle of ‘equality of arms’ demanded that all vulnerable individuals should be eligible for intermediary assistance.

Beyond Criminal Courts

The special measures regime in both England, Wales and Northern Ireland were originally intended to apply solely to criminal proceedings. However, requests began to be made for intermediary assistance in other justice fora, such as family courts and employment tribunals. Intermediaries now commonly assist vulnerable individuals in these settings in both jurisdictions. In a recent case in England and Wales, the High Court noted how the fundamental role of the intermediary in family courts and criminal courts is the same.1 As intermediaries have become more commonplace in criminal courts and family courts, relevant guidance has been developed to regulate the scope of their role in court. For example, in 2016, Mr Justice Charles, the Vice President of the Court of Protection in England and Wales published practical guidance entitled ‘Facilitating participation of ‘P’ and vulnerable persons in Court of Protection proceedings’. Another significant development in Great Britain has been the introduction of Practice Direction 1A, which also highlights the intermediary role in assisting vulnerable individuals to participate. In Northern Ireland, Practice Direction No.2/2019 contains detailed guidance on the intermediary role in criminal proceedings. Despite intermediaries regularly attending family court hearings, no equivalent guidance for civil courts has been issued.

Challenges

The intermediary role has played a significant part in the move towards promoting ‘best evidence’ and accommodating the needs of vulnerable individuals in court. In this regard, the role has been ‘little short of revolutionary’. The Victims’ Commissioner in England and Wales recently described it as ‘the single biggest improvement in the criminal justice system over the last thirty years’. While the intermediary role is becoming further embedded into justice processes, the role has encountered several challenges. Here are a few of the most important ones:

Duration of Appointment

Ultimately, the duration of an intermediary’s appointment is at the discretion of the court. The court may allow for an intermediary to assist the vulnerable individual for the period of oral evidence or for the entire court proceedings (or possibly for something in between). Understandably, the role of a defendant in a criminal trial is different from a witness so the length of time communication assistance will be required can vary. For example, a defendant will have legal conferences with their lawyers throughout a trial whereas a witness will not. The relevant Practice Direction in Northern Ireland states that the intermediary role is restricted to the period of oral testimony while in England and Wales, a court may exercise its powers to appoint an intermediary for longer. Again, this is at the discretion of the judge. Certain commercial providers of intermediaries, such as Communicourt, strongly argue that communication as a concept is broad and that providing intermediary assistance only for the period of evidence is superficial. The counterargument to this point is that with limited resources, intermediaries should be appointed where they are most needed.

Neutrality

As a relatively new actor to the justice system, the scope of the intermediary role has been contested. One key aspect of the role is that intermediaries operate as officers of the court and, as such, are impartial. How intermediaries operate to facilitate communication and remain impartial is a question that warrants attention. For example, if an intermediary assisting an extremely emotional witness feels that reassuring them might help them and reduce anxiety, is this breaching their impartiality? One anecdotal example from Northern Ireland involved an intermediary putting their arm around a young witness in court to comfort them. It was ultimately held by the judge that this ‘crossed the line’ and the intermediary’s involvement in the case ceased. Regardless of the venue, consideration should be given to how intermediaries can be enabled to carry out their primary role of facilitating communication and be viewed as impartial.

Skills and Qualifications

As discussed above, the majority of intermediaries in both England, Wales and Northern Ireland come from a background in speech and language therapy or social work. The MOJ in England and Wales has tried in recent years to diversify the registered intermediary cohort. In terms of the ‘matching’ of intermediaries to vulnerable individuals based on the nature of the communication issue, it is preferable that there is a wide pool of background and skillsets. For example, some intermediaries work exclusively with young children while others work with the elderly or with people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder2 or an intellectual disability. Ultimately, a court or tribunal appointing an intermediary should have the confidence that the intermediary has the requisite skillset to facilitate communication and provide clear, practical advice to the legal professionals. Although increasingly rare in practice, some courts have permitted lawyers to effectively cross-examine the intermediary about their experience and suitability for the role. It is suggested such a practice could underline the legitimacy of the role as well as the matching process undertaken by the DOJ or MOJ which have recruited, trained and ‘matched’ the intermediary to the vulnerable individual.

Intermediaries in Australia: Scope and Application

Following on from England, Wales and Northern Ireland, New South Wales was the first Australian jurisdiction to pass legislation for intermediaries in 2015.3 Currently, intermediaries are used within the criminal justice system in Tasmania, Queensland, South Australia4, New South Wales, Victoria5 and the Australian Capital Territory.6 Intermediaries are primarily used to assist vulnerable witnesses including children to give evidence for sexual offences and homicide cases.7 In the Victorian and ACT programmes, in addition to young people, any adult with a mental illness, intellectual disability, dementia or brain injury may be eligible to have an intermediary assist them in giving evidence in a police interview or court for particular criminal matter hearings.8 The reality is that vulnerable individuals experience barriers in access to justice not only in the criminal justice system, but, also in other areas that are connected to the broader legal system, including the civil justice system and court ordered Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR). In Australia, ADR processes are highly integrated in the legal system, thus many courts refer parties to participate in an ADR process. In many jurisdictions  attempting to participate in the ADR process may be a prerequisite to the matter proceeding to a hearing before the court.9

Potential Applications of the Intermediary in the Australian Civil Legal System

It can be argued that particular individuals who are identified as more likely to encounter greater barriers in access to justice than the general population, such as Autistic persons, or otherwise neurodivergent individuals, those living with a mental health condition or other neurological/intellectual disabilities, stand to benefit from an intermediary programme that is available in court ordered or legislation-based ADR processes.  Although it is recognised that ADR processes can be varied, this post focuses on the needs of Autistic persons who are subject to court ordered mediation.  While there is no research focused specifically on access to justice for Autistic people, there is significant research in relation to access to justice for people with disabilities.10 The Australian Law Reform Commission’s report11 details issues that may commonly arise when people with disabilities seek access to justice which include ‘communication barriers’ and ‘issues associated with giving instructions to legal representatives and capacity to participate in litigation’. The Report also discusses the issue of capacity to make decisions in their own best interest and in particular, the need for support in Decision-Making.12 Legal reform is likely to have limited practical impact if people do not have access to the support necessary to enable them to participate in legal processes.13 It is at this juncture that intermediaries have the opportunity to play an important role in supporting such individuals who participate in court ordered mediations, hence fostering greater access to justice.

Autistic people communicate differently to non-Autistic people. Further, Autistic people may misinterpret communication by others and may be misinterpreted in their own communication.14 This may give rise to challenges in access to justice in ADR contexts, particularly in mediation which is based on communication between the parties facilitated by a mediator. To fulfil the aims of the International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities,15 Autistic parties engaging in court-ordered ADR processes should have access to an intermediary for support if necessary. A pilot programme may be trialled where intermediaries are made available for court ordered16 family dispute resolution (FDR) mediations, based on clear eligibility criteria. Given the role of the intermediary is to facilitate communication and communication challenges being one of the most commonly challenging aspects of mediation for Autistic persons, this presents a valuable opportunity for Australia to lead other courts and extend the role of the intermediary into a new realm. Drawing on the experiences of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Australia stands to benefit in taking part in such a significant step towards improving access to justice in ADR for vulnerable individuals, who often experience disadvantage as parties in ADR processes.17

Author Biography

Dr Özlem Sűsler is a graduate of the University of Melbourne and La Trobe University. She holds degrees in Arts, Education and Law and has been admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria.

Özlem is a senior lecturer at La Trobe University, School of Law, where she coordinates and teaches ADR and Contract Law in the JD and LLB programmes. She is the immediate past director of the JD Programme. Dr Susler has researched and published internationally on ADR in the fields of international commercial arbitration and the scholarship of learning and teaching. More recently she has conducted qualitative research into the experience of Autistic persons engaging in ADR processes (publication forthcoming). Dr Susler has also played a key role in coaching La Trobe Law students in various ADR Mooting competitions. She is a graduate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the Australian Institute of Company Directors and an AMDRAS accredited mediator.

Dr John Taggart is a Lecturer in Law at Queens’ University, Belfast and the Director of the Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice (ICCJ). He holds a PhD in Law from the London School of Economics (LSE) and is a member of the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland and a member of Lincoln’s Inn. John’s research focuses on the criminal process, criminal justice and socio-legal approaches to criminal law. John’s research looks at special measures in criminal courts and the role of the intermediary as a communication specialist for vulnerable court users. He has recently worked as an academic consultant to the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Human Rights Commission and as a legal trainer to the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. John has published widely in publications including the Criminal Law Review, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, International Journal of Law in Context and the Journal of Law and Society.

  1. West Northamptonshire Council (acting via Northamptonshire Children’s Trust) v KA (Mother & Anor) (Intermediaries) [2024] EWHC 79 [43].
    ↩︎
  2. Autism Spectrum Disorder is referred to as ‘autism’ hereafter.  The term ‘autism’ throughout this paper intends to refer to individuals with a diagnosis of autism and no co-occurring intellectual disability. This article uses identity-first language (e.g., ‘Autistic person’) because many autistic people prefer it (Bury et al., 2020; Kenny et al., 2016), and it is considered less discriminatory (Bottema-Beutel et al., 2021).
    ↩︎
  3. See Criminal Procedure Amendment (Child Sexual Offence) Evidence Pilot Act 2015 (NSW).
    ↩︎
  4. South Australia provides a communication assistance scheme. See Evidence Act 1929 (SA) and Summary Offences Regulations 2016 (SA).
    ↩︎
  5. New South Wales introduced an intermediary programme in 2016 and Victoria in 2018.
    ↩︎
  6. Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment Act 2019 (ACT).
    ↩︎
  7. See eg <https://www.justice.vic.gov.au/justice-system/courts-and-tribunals/intermediary-program/about-the-intermediary-program#program-history>.
    ↩︎
  8. See eg <https://www.justice.vic.gov.au/justice-system/courts-and-tribunals/intermediary-program/about-the-intermediary-program#program-history>. In Victoria the criminal matters are restricted to witnesses in homicide matters and victims of sexual abuse.
    ↩︎
  9. For example. the Federal and Family Circuit Court of Australia generally makes it mandatory (unless exceptions apply) for the parties to be referred to Family Dispute Resolution under s.13C(1)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to attempt to resolve their disputes.
    ↩︎
  10. See, eg, ‘The Justice Project’ Final Report, Part 1 ‘People with Disability’ (August 2018) Law Council of Australia <https://lawcouncil.au/justice-project/final-report>.
    ↩︎
  11. Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws – Final Report, August 2014 available at <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/equality-capacity-and-disability-in-commonwealth-laws-alrc-report-124/>.
    ↩︎
  12. Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws (Final Report, August 2014) p 4. (Access to justice issues | ALRC).
    ↩︎
  13. Ibid p 7.
    ↩︎
  14. See eg, Maya Albin, Isabella Chawrun, and Ami Tint, “Rethinking Social Communication Support: Exploring Communication Partner Training for Autistic Adults and Their Neurotypical Communication Partners” (2024) Autism in Adulthood <https://doi.org/10.1089/aut.2023.0>
    ↩︎
  15. ‘International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities’ (2020) United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Hereinafter referred to as ‘Guidelines’.
    ↩︎
  16. This programme would be implemented through the Australian Family and Federal Circuit Courts.
    ↩︎
  17. Forthcoming qualitative research article on the disadvantage experienced by Autistic adults who participated as a party to mediation is available upon request from Dr Ozlem Susler.
    ↩︎

Unnecessarily Adversarial: Has the Time Come For a New Criminal Defence Paradigm?

Posted on by
3

 

By Joana Bourouphael

This post is written by Joana Bourouphael, a student who studied Non-Adversarial Justice at the Faculty of Law at Monash University in 2016. Joana was part of the unique placement program for that unit, an example of Work Integrated Learning. In the program, students spend 3-5 days at an organisation experiencing both adversarial and ‘non-adversarial’ practices. Students are then expected to produce a written assignment that addresses both practical and theoretical insights into an issue relating to non-adversarial justice. This post demonstrates how direct experience of legal processes enriches the learning experiences of participating students.

head in hands

Photo Credit: L’art au present

This post has been written in response to a placement I completed where I shadowed a barrister in a murder trial. The majority of my observances surrounded witness examination. The post begins with a brief description of my experience of the adversary system and what I was able to witness. This is followed by an introduction to the adversary system in Australia and the features of it that are relevant for my critique. Some problems of the adversary system are then highlighted before proposals for reform are suggested.

 

 1. MY OWN “WAR STORY”

The first time I stepped into the courtroom, I believe I had done so with an open mind. I had been sceptical of all the bad press that adversarialism had received and was of the firm view that in certain circumstances adversarialism was nothing short of necessary. Success of non-adversarial approaches in the criminal justice system has often been limited to and has tended to focus on areas such as substance-abuse and mental health. Naturally then, I did not expect to walk out of a murder trial frustrated at the fact it was too adversarial, or what I would describe as unnecessarily adversarial. And yet, that is exactly what happened.

Perhaps setting the scene would prove helpful. Picture this: a quivering witness, a fully grown adult male, nervously sweating and anxiously fiddling with the pen in front of him, umming and ahing as he was cross-examined by the straight-faced defence counsel, looking back and forth between the judge, the lawyer, and the 12 members of the jury who all starred at this man. He had come forward to the police with his evidence out of his own choice, as he attempted to respond to, ‘You consider yourself a clever person, don’t you Mr X? So why can’t you answer my question with a simple yes or no?’ In the meantime, behind the patronising echoes of the defence counsel, tucked away at the back of the court, sat a man clutching a rosary as he attempted, and failed, at holding himself back from tears. A man who, at the end of the trial, may very well be spending the rest of his life in prison and yet his only contribution to this long and gruelling process was to sit at the back of the court room day after day, as mere observer in a trial that had the potential to affect the rest of his life.

Watching this scene unfold, I thought back to a passage from one of the introductory readings from the Australian Law Reform Commission 103 [1.119] for the Monash University Non-Adversarial Justice unit:

 ‘The term “adversarial” also connotes a competitive battle between foes or contestants and is often associated in popular culture with partisan and unfair litigation tactics. Battle and sporting imagery are commonly used in reference to our legal system. Lawyers’ anecdotes about the courtroom are “war stories”.’

Although, at the time, I thought of this passage as an exaggerated view of the adversarial system: mere hyperbole used in order to stimulate change, the scene I witnessed before me seemed to act out this description perfectly. As Enright puts forward in his article ‘Tactical Adversarialism and Protective adversarialism’, ‘many lawyers are culturally attached to, if not addicted to, the notion of adversarialism’ (Despite its attraction for lawyers, the prevalence of the adversarial system should be dependent on its functional adequacy and its ability to effectively and efficiently deliver the goals of the court.

 

 2. THE ADVERSARIAL PARADIGM

 The key aspect of Australia’s adversarial legal system is that it gives primacy to the parties. In essence, and as put forward by the Australian Law Reform Commission 103 [1.117], ‘the parties, not the judge, have the primary responsibility for defining the issues in dispute and for carrying the dispute forward’. The presiding judge takes no part in the investigation or the calling of evidence and their intervention during the trial is usually minimal. In Doggett v The Queen (2001), Gleeson CJ described such a system as reflecting ‘values that respect both the autonomy of the parties to the trial process and the impartiality of the judge and jury’. The adversarial system prides itself on certain strengths, which the Australian Law Reform Commission 32 [2.38] considers to include, ‘impartiality, independence, consistency, flexibility and the democratic character’ of its processes.

In Queen v Whithom (1983), Dawson J said that, ‘A trial does not involve the pursuit of truth by any means’. It has become rather evident that, in the adversarial system, justice means adherence to process. Truth is subservient to proof. Enright refers to adversarialism as a ‘prove it’ system, whereby the adversaries who access the court must prove their case to the required standard; it is then for the court to declare a ‘winner’. This imagery of competition and battle reoccurs throughout the literature analysing the system, highlighting that the framework itself is based on conflict rather than cooperation, a criticism of the system that will be discussed in relation to my personal observations.

 

3. PROBLEMS WITH THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

 Geoffrey Robertson QC in 1998 said in his book The Justice Game, ‘we can’t avoid the fact that the adversary system does make justice a game’. This focus on justice as something to be won or lost like a pawn on a chessboard, as opposed to the aspiration for justice to be attained, is certainly not a new image of the system. Enright tells us that, over time, the adversarial system has been described as one where the parties ‘fight the contest’ and become ‘ego-invested in appearing ‘right’ and ‘winning’’, where the focus is on ‘game-playing’, ‘ignoring the human element’, competing in a ‘battle’, which is a ‘fight to the death where the winner was the last man standing’ ().

Although I had hoped the above descriptions would be far from accurate when I witnessed a trial for myself, I can only say with grave disappointment that my experience of the adversarial system failed to prove those descriptions wrong. My critique, and therefore also my proposals for reform, focuses mainly on the defence barrister, who exploited his right to ask leading questions with total disregard for what effect this would have on the witnesses he was cross-examining. The barrister’s aggressive demeanour and patronising tone had different affects on different witnesses. Many looked as though they were uncomfortable, eager for their questioning to conclude so they could leave. Some became frustrated with the defence counsel’s approach, whilst others became genuinely distressed by the process. Even I, as an observer, felt uncomfortable and concerned for the witness. It is not that what the defence counsel was doing was wrong. Counsel was seeking to discredit witnesses and poke holes of doubt into the prosecution’s case; a reasonable approach to take. It is difficult to see, however, how these methods of using the witnesses merely as a means to an end can be justified. Moreover, as an observer, and as I suspect the jury felt, I couldn’t help but naturally feel against the defence. It is difficult to want to trust and believe someone who appears willing to go to any lengths to prove themselves right and ‘win’.

 

4. THE NEED FOR REFORM

 The Hon Michael Kirby warns us not to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. An adversarial system will inevitably give rise to adversarialism, and some adversarialism is indeed necessary. Although it is not recommended that adversarialism be removed in its entirety, (after all, it does come with its benefits), it is arguable that the system has become unnecessarily adversarial. Enright distinguishes between this ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adversarialism, distinguishing ‘protective’ adversarialism, which is essential for justice, and ‘tactical’ adversarialism, which is toxic to justice. He says that tactical adversarialism ‘occurs where the rules and practices allow a lawyer to attempt to win the case by means of tricks and stratagems that have no connection with the merits of the case’. It is this desire to win at all costs, which is sometimes referred to as ‘zealous advocacy’, that I was able to witness for myself in the defence lawyer (King et al, 2014, 266). It is this ‘tactical’ adversarialism, which is unnecessary and unjustifiably present in the justice system, that should be ‘thrown out’.

 a. REFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION

 Moving forward, one of the simplest and arguably most effective reforms would be in the field of legal education. Reforming legal education to focus less on what lawyers need to know and more on what lawyers need to do would help solve some of the problems with the adversarial system that were adumbrated earlier on. By reforming legal education, the legal profession is inadvertently affected and therefore, so is the justice system itself. Making positive changes to the way students are taught in law school would remove the unnecessary adversarialism in both legal practice and culture.

Currently in Australia, law schools are highly competitive environments that use case-based teachings, which focus on appellate judgments and use written examinations to assess students. Freiberg, in her journal ‘Non-adversarial approaches to criminal justice’, says that, ‘current teaching practices are, to a large extent, based on the adversarial paradigm’, but it is possible for this argument to work both ways. Although the adversarial framework of the Australian system has meant that legal education has followed this practice to give rise to law courses that are inherently adversarial, the emphasis law schools put on adversarialism has arguably fuelled or exacerbated this culture of competition and the image of the lawyer as a ‘zealous advocate’. In order to change the legal culture so that a defence lawyer doesn’t feel the need to push a witness to what might be described as the edge of having a breakdown, at the off chance that this would better help him ‘win’, it is necessary to address the problem at its root: law schools which plant seeds of adversarialism into each and every law student.

Countless reports and papers have been published recommending such reform. The Australian Law Reform Commission stated that legal education should focus on what lawyers need to be able to do, as opposed to what they need to know; the MacCrate Report by the American Bar Association in 1992 recommended traditional legal teachings be integrated with practical lawyering skills; the Carnegie Report said that there should be ethical and social skills teaching in order to engage the ‘moral imagination’ of students. How can these recommendations be brought to life in law schools?

The content of the curriculum of law schools requires change. The aims of law schools need to be re-evaluated and reflected through their teachings. The “Priestley 11”, as found in the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2008, which fails to address the need for practical skills, is somewhat out-dated. Freiberg provides a helpful list of items that the curriculum should also provide, including an understanding of the nature of conflict, skills in negotiation and mediation, subjects that were problem-based as well as doctrine- or theory-based, and an understanding that cases involve real people and therefore have psychological and emotional aspects to them.

Although making changes to the content of classes is a good place to start, it is not enough to remove the preoccupation of unnecessary adversarialism. In their journal article ‘The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity Legal’, Sturm and Guinier say that education must move away from what they call a culture of ‘competition and conformity’, arguing that law school culture should be made an integral part of the conversation about law school reform. Their justification of which is that the legal culture will shape a lawyer’s ‘modes of thought, their language, their self image as professionals, their particular professional and organizational history’. It is evident, therefore, that the legal culture law students are nourished in, where they develop into lawyers, has a great effect on the legal profession as a whole. It is also important to recognise, however, that to change the legal culture, one that has been passed down through generations of lawyers and to which most legal professionals are attached, is not to be considered a light task and can only occur over considerable time. This is particularly so since law schools, as relatively conservative institutions, are rather resistant to fundamental change.

 b. REFORMING THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE

 Reforming legal education, although necessary, may have limited effects on the confrontational environment witnessed within a courtroom. A somewhat more drastic reform may look to alter the role of the judge to something more akin to the inquisitorial systems present in most of Europe, what many writers refer to as ‘active, not passive, judges’ (See, eg Freiberg, 2007, 217).

The inquisitorial system is dominated by the preliminary investigation stage where a file or dossier is prepared which is relied upon throughout the case and contains witness statements and all the evidence gathered. It is then the judge who presents the evidence and conducts the trial process whilst the lawyers play the more passive part. In some ways, the roles are the reverse of what is seen in an adversarial system. What this means is that although both systems have the seeking of truth as their aim, the adversarial system attempts to do this by pitting the two parties against each other in the hope that the competition will reveal the truth. This is one of the main reasons why the inquisitorial stem is far less confrontational and appears far less conflict-focused or competitive. Furthermore, because less emphasis is placed on oral evidence there is very little, if any, cross-examination of witnesses in the manner of an adversarial trial and it is the judge who conducts witness questioning. This means that the adverse affects on innocent witnesses, like those I had witnessed myself, are greatly reduced in the inquisitorial system. Moreover, since in the adversarial system it is the parties that choose which evidence to produce, there is no guarantee that they will present everything that is relevant if it has the potential to harm their case. This is, of course, avoided in the inquisitorial system where it is down to the judge to collect evidence and choose what should be presented.

It should be noted, however, that judicial impartiality is considered a major strength of the Australian adversarial system. Malleson described it as, ‘a key principle which is valued not just as a means of ensuring fair and truthful judgements but for its key role in maintaining public confidence in the decisions of the court’. The fact that the judge is independent of and separate from the prosecuting authority ensures that both parties are treated fairly and guarantees impartial treatment without bias. Former Chief Justice Gleeson referred to a judge’s demeanour as giving ‘to the parties an assurance that their case will be heard and determined on the merits, and not according to some personal predisposition on the part of the judge’. This effectively means the system is less prone to abuse and doesn’t promote bias.

 

5. CONCLUSION

Courts in common law jurisdictions such as Australia are a part of criminal justice system based on an adversarial system of law. The system relies on a two-sided structure of opposing sides that present their position on the case before an impartial judge. It is this framework, whereby adversaries are pitted against each other in order to reveal the truth to the judge, which creates an environment of tension and conflict within the courtroom. I had the opportunity to personally witness this confrontational setting in the context of a murder trial, and was critical of what I had observed. This essay therefore analysed the negative aspects of the criminal trial process that I was able to see, focusing mainly on the unnecessary adversarialism emanating from the defence lawyer.

One suggestion is the reform of legal education. This is arguably the best place to start in order to truly remove the negative aspects of the courtroom atmosphere such as conflict and confrontation. It would address the problem from its root by altering the curriculum to include non-adversarial classes but should also look to changing the culture of law school away from one of competition, where ‘winning’ is seen as the ultimate goal. A successful change in the culture of law schools would resonate through to the legal profession and the justice system.

A second proposal, which addresses the issues of adversarialism more directly but that is also a more substantive change to the current adversarial framework, would be to alter the role of the judge to be more like what exists in inquisitorial systems. In the adversarial system, the judge is often described as ‘impartial’. Lawton LJ said, ‘I regard myself as a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts, I must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play’ (Laker Airways Ltd v. Department of Trade [1977]). Such a system is often contrasted to the inquisitorial system where the judge has a key role to play in the investigation and the calling of witnesses. This shifts control of the case from the adversaries to the judge, diminishing the element of conflict between both sides and removing the power of the defence lawyer to create confrontation.

Although I believe there is a need to reform legal education, not only to keep up to date with the forever evolving justice system, but also to better the legal culture, I doubt it would be sufficient to have a substantial impact on the dynamics of the courtroom. For such a change, more direct reform is needed, for instance, the reform of the judicial role. It is, however, recognised that many legal professionals have a certain attachment to adversarialism and so the deep-rooted, entrenched legal culture and long-standing role of the judiciary will not be easy to uproot. Nonetheless, it seems to be the appropriate way forward in order to move away from the current system of conflict and confrontation.

 

Joana Bourouphael is a third year law student at the University of Warwick and is currently on one-year exchange at Monash University. Her enjoyment for advocacy has lead her to get involved in many mooting competitions, including the national Landmarks Chambers Mooting Competition 2016. She has also been involved in pro bono work with the Warwick Death Penalty Project Group, as well as with the Bar Pro Bono Unit. Additionally, she is set to trek Machu Picchu in aid of the Make-A-Wish in September 2017.

 Twitter handle: @JBourouphael