Rethinking Family Mediation in England and Wales, and Beyond

Posted on 31/07/2025 by Milan A Nitopi

Dr Rachael Blakey

For several decades, the Australian family dispute resolution literature has examined the operation of family mediation and other family dispute resolution procedures. Much of this data comes from funded evaluations and projects following the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibilities) Act 2006. However, the English and Welsh literature on contemporary family mediation is limited in comparison. Much of our research has remained focused on the court system, even though many, if not most, people involved in child arrangements or post-separation financial matters deal with their disputes outside of it. My monograph, Rethinking Family Mediation: The Role of the Mediator in Contemporary Times, seeks to reinvigorate discourse and debate on family mediator practice within not only England and Wales, but also other jurisdictions, including Australia. Its opening paragraph reads:

‘Family mediation, like many other procedures, is in a transitionary period. Several traditional concepts – neutrality, facilitation and non-legal support – continue to dominate the discussions around the role of family mediation and the family mediator. These notions remain fundamental to family mediator practice, though their hold has weakened over time. Following decades of reform to the family justice landscape, the work of family mediators is now underpinned by a number of other concepts: flexibility, evaluation and, sometimes, quasi-legal oversight. Family mediators continue to perform their traditional functions, but balance them alongside a rising demand to adapt. They follow a flexible conceptualization in order to provide more comprehensive support to their clients, many of whom have limited access to legal or other advice in the early 21st century.’ (Blakey 2025, p. 1)

Today’s English and Welsh family justice system is very different to that in Australia. We do not have any triage system like the Child and Family Hubs, nor is family dispute resolution mandated. In fact, the Ministry of Justice recently backtracked from 2023 proposals to require most private family law disputants to demonstrate a ‘reasonable attempt to mediate’ before initiating court proceedings, citing concerns about the use of family mediation in cases of domestic abuse. Interestingly, amendments to our Family Procedure Rules in April 2024 mean that judges now have more power to adjourn court proceedings to encourage the use of ‘non-court dispute resolution’ (including family mediation). Judges can also impose a cost order on parties who do not attend a non-court dispute resolution process ‘without good reason’. Whether the Family Procedure Rules have led to non-court dispute resolution becoming mandatory has yet to be seen. Regardless, Rethinking Family Mediation offers valuable insights for family dispute resolution practitioners and academics in various other jurisdictions. It illustrates how policy and legislation can shape mediator practice over time, highlighting mediation’s central positioning within the broader family justice system.

Uncovering the transition from limited to flexible mediator practice

The key thesis underpinning Rethinking Family Mediation is that the role of the family mediator (particularly in England and Wales) has broadened over time, and it is the lack of recognition that this development has occurred, not the development itself, that is inherently problematic. More specifically, I argue that there has been a transition from a limited mediator archetype to a flexible mediator archetype.

The limited mediator archetype is how family mediation practice was, and typically continues to be, conceptualised. They are facilitative and strictly neutral, ensuring that decision-making power rests with the parties at all times. This limited archetype was logical in the traditional English and Welsh family justice system when funding was accessible for many separating parties. Many individuals could still afford a lawyer, even if they were not eligible for legal aid. The limited mediator’s strictly facilitative role was thus appropriate, as more evaluative support and guidance was provided by a lawyer (or other legal practitioner) (figure 1). Nonetheless, the monograph uncovers a long-standing neutrality dilemma for family mediators: neutrality prohibits them from reacting to a power imbalance, yet, in many instances, to do nothing is also an unneutral act. This paradox suggests that the limited mediator was never a perfect or perhaps even ideal archetype.

Figure 1: A binary understanding of facilitative and evaluative behaviours

This critique holds even more weight today. The family justice system in England and Wales is drastically different to when family mediation was first piloted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Over several decades, policy has increasingly presented mediation as the norm, not simply an alternative, for family matters. This push for private ordering accumulated in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) which, as of April 2013, removed legal aid for the majority of private family law court proceedings. At the same time, traditional legal support has become increasingly inaccessible for most separating families. Both factors have led family mediation’s clientele to diversify, with many cases now involving complex legal disputes or difficult party dynamics. The limited mediator, who is unable to provide any form of evaluation, is poorly suited to this clientele. Calls for mediators to adapt have increased as a result.

The monograph argues that mediators have transitioned to a flexible archetype over several decades. It recognises that the demand – both within policy and academic scholarship – for mediators to do more is, in fact, a call for mediators to become more evaluative. The flexible mediator archetype continues to perform a facilitative role, but evaluation is woven within their practices. Facilitation and evaluation are thus not a binary distinction, but rather two concepts on a continuum of mediator practice (as originally proposed by Riskin in 1996, though much of the contemporary English and Welsh literature on family mediation does not acknowledge his work). Mediator neutrality is subsequently re-understood as a moderate concept that does not need to be strictly upheld when doing so would compromise fairness or another normative concept. My monograph recognises that the flexible mediator archetype operated prior to the LASPO reforms, with a number of earlier studies demonstrating the varied work of mediators. However, it is submitted that the contemporary family justice landscape necessitates the archetype even further.

Revealing the flexible mediator archetype after the LASPO reforms

In England and Wales, and many other jurisdictions, debates around how to reform family mediation often become circular. It is said that change is needed to provide a better service. However, such change is not possible under the traditional conceptualisation of the (limited) family mediator. Rethinking Family Mediation submits that this stagnancy is resolved if the flexible mediator archetype is explicitly recognised.

To inform debate, the book outlines findings from an empirical project, consisting of a content analysis of family mediation Codes of Practice and semi-structured interviews with 17 family mediators. Its empirical findings first reveal a new theoretical framework of four mediation functions, all of which are recognised and adopted by both family mediators and their regulatory bodies (figure 2). Mediators are primarily helpers, but regularly evaluate the proposed settlement or party dynamic to determine if they should become referrers to another service (notably legal advice). Mediator evaluation becomes significantly more prominent as they become assessors and, furthermore, intervenors. Additional interview data shows that mediators feel that they are responsible for responding to difficult party dynamics and unfair settlements, justifying their more evaluative practices. Of particular note within the empirical data is the mediator sample’s regular reference to legal rules, set out in both legislation and case precedent. This alludes to a growing quasi-legal role for today’s family mediators, most likely influenced by the withdrawal of accessible legal support after the LASPO reforms.

Figure 2: The mediator function framework, plotted on a continuum of facilitative to evaluative strategies

These more evaluative behaviours are discussed by the entire mediator sample, even if a participant understands their neutrality in very strict, absolute terms. Intriguingly, over two-fifths of the mediator sample prefer an alternative understanding of their neutrality that enables them to intervene in negotiations to encourage a good quality settlement. This stance appears more closely aligned with the concept of impartiality, rather than neutrality, though whether the former is a better term to describe the flexible mediator archetype is unclear (mirroring similar debates in Australia).

Implications for family justice going forward

The quasi-legal role of flexible mediators, as identified through the monograph’s empirical data, has significant implications for the professionalism and training of the profession. One chapter of Rethinking Family Mediation specifically considers the extrinsic and organisational barriers to reform, asking whether family mediation should be regarded as a ‘legal service’ under English and Welsh legislation. While the monograph does not provide a definitive answer to the question, it hopes to reinvigorate debate in the area. The chapter also uncovers findings on the current status of family mediation services at a time when the government expects parties to mediate but has provided very little government funding to support mediators themselves.

Importantly, the findings covered in this book have significant implications for our understanding of family justice. Family justice is generally understood as something that is only available through court (and supported by legal representation). Yet much of the empirical data discussed in the book is evidence of a shift in not only family mediator practice, but family justice itself. In the contemporary English and Welsh, as well as Australian, landscape, family justice is increasingly provided through non-lawyers, such as mediators, who are often informed by legal norms. The book connects these changes to a rising hybridity across family law practice, with lawyers additionally becoming more collaborative and less adversarial over time.

This contemporary vision of family justice is not ideal, nor perfect. Without further scrutiny of the various professionals within the family justice system, the risk of improper or unfair outcomes increases. However, Rethinking Family Mediation is premised on finding pragmatic solutions to the challenges within our modern family justice systems. In order to do so, the reality of non-dispute resolution practice must be identified and, importantly, recognised.

It is of no surprise that the monograph regularly returns to the concealment of the flexible mediator archetype – and most likely many other flexible practitioners – as a key issue within our current discourse around family justice reform. Ultimately, it argues that the changes in family mediator practice have been both a natural part of the profession’s development, as well as a consequence of the contemporary family justice system with limited funding and inaccessible legal support. The book will therefore be of significant interest to anyone interested in learning more about family dispute resolution in terms of not simply how the process was traditionally conceived, but how it operates in reality.

Author Biography

Dr Rachael Blakey is an Associate Professor at the University of Warwick. Her research focuses on family mediation and access to justice. She is a co-opted Director of the Family Mediation Council, the main regulatory body for family mediators in England and Wales. Rachael is interested in legal professionalism more widely, and is currently conducting the first empirical study on the English and Welsh ‘one-lawyer-two-clients’ format of family law support.

Author details: rachael.blakey@warwick.ac.uk | University Profile | LinkedIn | Rethinking Family Mediation: The Role of The Family Mediator in Contemporary Times (Bristol University Press 2025)

All figures were provided with permission from Bristol University Press.

Are Mediators Ever Liable? Rethinking Accountability in Our Practice

Posted on 18/07/2025 by Dr Samantha Hardy

Samantha Hardy
This article has been republished with permission. The original publication can be found at The Conflict Management Academy.

Inspired by Jennifer L. Schulz (2023). Mediator Liability 23 Years Later: The “Three C’s” of Case Law, Codes, & Custom. Ottawa Law Review / Revue de droit d’Ottawa, 55(1):151–186. Available at: https://doi.org/10.7202/1112508ar

A Quiet Assumption

For many of us working in the mediation field, there’s a quiet assumption we rarely question: that we’re not likely to be sued for what happens in a mediation room.

And, to date, that assumption has mostly held true. While a few attempts to sue mediators have occurred in different jurisdictions around the world, none have resulted in a mediator having to pay compensation to a party.

Canadian mediator and law professor Jennifer Schulz reviews 23 years of case law across six common law countries—including Australia—asking why mediators are not being held liable and arguing that they should be. The article is well worth reading in full, as the detailed summaries of the cases examined provide a vivid picture of the current gap between our aspirational standards of practice and the lack of accountability for those who do not meet them.

The Current Reality: A Legal Shield

Schulz’s research confirms what many of us might suspect: across Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand, England, and South Africa, courts are still not holding mediators legally liable for negligent practice.

Even in cases involving mediator coercion, numerical errors in settlements, inappropriate behaviour, or poor handling of vulnerable parties, the most common judicial response is to set aside the agreement—not to hold the mediator accountable.

There are four main reasons for this legal shield:

Causation hurdles – it’s hard to prove that a mediator’s actions caused a party’s loss.
Mediator immunity – either through legislation (as in many US states and Australian courts) or through contractual terms.
Mediation confidentiality – which often prevents complainants from even introducing evidence of wrongdoing.
Lack of a defined standard of care – without it, there’s nothing to measure negligence against.

As Schulz puts it, we’re operating in a legal vacuum—where professional expectations are high, but legal consequences are rare.

The “Three C’s” Proposal: A Way Forward?

Schulz doesn’t advocate for a wave of mediator lawsuits. Instead, she proposes a more thoughtful framework for developing legal accountability: the Three C’s.

Case Law – court decisions that, even if inconsistent, begin to sketch the boundaries of acceptable practice.
Codes of Conduct – such as those issued by AMDRAS, state-based mediator panels, or court-connected schemes.
Custom – what a reasonable mediator would do in a given situation, based on community norms and practice standards.

I would personally add another C, perhaps attached to the Codes of Conduct item – and that is Complaints. More could be done to educate clients about what they should be able to expect from their mediator, and mediator complaints services could be more courageous and transparent about how they respond to client complaints. Complaints handling that is half-hearted or that aims to protect mediators rather than hold them publicly accountable only exacerbates the problem and pushes it underground.

These sources could help courts (and the profession) articulate what counts as competent mediation (the basis for a standard of care in negligence) and what crosses the line.

What the Cases Tell Us

The article walks through dozens of cases—some troubling, some absurd, many familiar. A few key themes emerge:

1. Coercive Behaviour Is Common—But Unpunished

Multiple cases involve mediators who pressured parties to settle, made legal predictions, lost their tempers, or belittled participants. Courts have rarely responded with consequences—unless the party was unrepresented and severely disadvantaged. The courts typically assume that if a party is legally represented, their lawyer will protect them from any harm.

Notably, some cases even include allegations of racist or discriminatory remarks by mediators—again, without findings of liability.

2. Vulnerability Is Often Overlooked

Incapacity cases—where a party was overwhelmed, unwell, or otherwise unable to engage effectively—are nearly always dismissed. Courts seem to assume that the voluntary nature of mediation allows a party to stop participating at any time, so choosing to continue negates their right to claim. This type of thinking shows a lack of understanding of how incapacity might show up, in that it might also make someone incapable of making a good choice to leave the mediation.

3. Mediators Who Make Mistakes Still Escape Consequence

From drafting errors to bad legal advice, mediators are largely shielded unless the consequences are glaring and the party can prove they were misled into harm. In such cases, courts tend to place responsibility on the parties’ lawyers—even where the mediator dictated the settlement. Even where there is no lawyer involved, the likely outcome is that the agreement will be set aside, rather than any consequences for the mediator.

Implications for Australian Practice

So what does this mean for those of us practising under the AMDRAS framework or in private, court-connected, or hybrid contexts?

Legal immunity doesn’t mean ethical impunity. Just because we’re unlikely to be sued doesn’t mean we shouldn’t hold ourselves—and each other—to higher standards.
Custom matters. If the law ever does change, it will likely rely on what we say is normal, ethical, and good practice in our mediation communities.
The codes we sign up to should guide us daily—not just when we’re audited or accredited. They may form the basis of future legal standards.
Training matters. When mediators pressure parties, overlook incapacity, or provide questionable advice, it’s often due to poor training, not bad intentions.
RABs need to have rigorous complaints processes. Until the courts step up and impose consequences on mediators who behave badly, the mediator’s accreditation body must be able to manage complaints effectively to prevent harm to parties and the profession’s reputation. This means holding mediators accountable for improper behaviour and educating members about where the line will be drawn.
Industry/peak bodies could play an important role in educating clients about their rights/expectations of a mediator. It’s one thing for mediators to hold themselves accountable (and be required to do so through professional standards). It’s another for a client to be informed and educated about the treatment they are entitled to receive.

It is also important to acknowledge that there are many cases in which aggrieved clients lash out at mediators who have done nothing wrong. Vexatious complaints seem particularly common in the family sector, and it is important that the practitioners involved are treated with respect and allowed to defend themselves with dignity.

A Profession at the Crossroads

Mediation has come a long way—from fringe alternative to mainstream dispute resolution. With that growth comes a challenge: do we want the status of a profession without the accountability?

Schulz’s article offers a roadmap. The future of mediator liability may not lie in sudden lawsuits or rigid standards, but in a profession willing to evolve its own definitions of excellence, to recognise when harm has been done, and to hold people accountable.

As Australian mediators, particularly with the new AMDRAS standards about to come into effect, we’re well placed to lead this conversation. The question is: will we?